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ABSTRACT
Team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both
in the lab and in the field despite the moral hazard in teams
problem identified by Holmström (1982). In a newly developed
virtual workplace, we show that, in line with Holmström, moral
hazard in teams is indeed pervasive. Subsequently, we find strong
evidence for the conjecture of Kandel and Lazear (1992) that
peer pressure may resolve the moral hazard in teams problem.
Organizations equipped with a very weak form of peer monitoring
(anonymous and without physical proximity, verbal threats or
face-to-face interactions) perform as well as those using individual
incentives.
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“An organization can secure the efforts necessary to its existence,
then, either by the objective inducements it provides or by changing
states of mind. . . . We shall call the process of offering objective
incentives “the method of incentives”; and the processes of changing
subjective attitudes “the method of persuasion.”
—Barnard (1938, p. 142)
Online Appendix available from:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/105.00000040_app
ISSN 2326-6198; DOI 10.1561/105.00000040
©2015 B. Corgnet, R. Hernán-González, and S. Rassenti
380 Brice Corgnet et al
1 Introduction
1.1 Team Incentives in the Theory of Organizations
As a point of departure for the analysis of organizations and the development
of an economic theory of the firm, theorists have put forward the pervasiveness
of free-riding behaviors in teams in which it is difficult to observe and verify
the contribution of each partner (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström,
1982).
At the empirical level, the evidence of free riding behavior in teams has
been limited (e.g., Leibowitz and Tollison, 1980; Encinosa et al., 2007). Instead,
team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both in laboratory
experiments (Van Dijk et al., 2001; Dohmen and Falk, 2011) and in field studies
(Dumaine, 1990, 1994; Kruse, 1992; Manz and Sims, 1993; Ichniowski et al.,
1996; Hansen, 1997; Ichniowski et al., 1997; Hamilton et al., 2003; Babcock
et al., 2015). For example, Hamilton et al. (2003) show that equal sharing of
production bonuses within teams stimulates cooperation, information sharing,
monitoring and even mutual training, generating a productivity increase
(relative to individual incentives) despite the expected free-rider problem. In a
recent paper, Babcock et al. (2015) show that team incentives can outperform
individual incentives in fostering students’ attendance to the university gym
Club.
Admittedly, shirking behaviors have been observed pervasively in the public
good game literature (Ledyard, 1995). However, the present paper as well as
the previously mentioned literature focus on the effect of incentives on shirking
behaviors. The aim is to assess the difference, if any, in shirking behaviors
when people are paid according to team versus individual incentives.
In this study, we are able to compare team and individual incentives
while controlling for team-specific features that may interfere in the empirical
assessment of team incentives. This is crucial because the empirical difficulty
in identifying the free-riding behaviors in teams is likely due to the lack of
control over crucial aspects of work teams. For example, peer monitoring,
interpersonal relations or implicit incentives (e.g., firing threats) may have
acted as confounding factors in the evaluation of team incentives.
Our experimental environment differs from previous experimental settings
as it introduces a long real-effort work task as well as real-time access to leisure
activities (Internet browsing). We find that production levels were on average
32.8% lower under team incentives than under individual incentives. This
corresponds to a decrease in subjects’ hourly production of $1.65 or 20.7% of
the minimum hourly wage where the experiments were conducted. This result
was driven by extensive shirking behaviors in the team incentives treatment
in which subjects spent on average 28.5% of their time browsing the Internet.
These results are consistent with incentives theory (see Holmström (1979) and
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Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review) as they confirm the sound premise
that performance is increased by the use of high-powered incentives schemes.
As a second step of our analysis, we introduced a real-time monitoring
technology in our virtual organizations so as to assess whether the poor
performance of team incentives could be mitigated by peer pressure.
1.2 Supervision and Peer-monitoring in the Theory of Organizations
Supervision is an important aspect of the theory of the firm that was mentioned
by preeminent scholars as one of the raison d’être of organizations (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Barzel, 1982; Chandler, 1992). Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
put forward the need for centralized supervision in a context of asymmetric
information between managers and their subordinates in a team context.
They stress that peer monitoring is not an efficient mechanism because the
agents would tend to shy away from monitoring activities. However, other
theories view peer monitoring as a highly-effective mechanism (Kandel and
Lazear, 1992; Mohnen et al., 2008; Carpenter et al., 2009; Gill and Stone,
2015). For example, Kandel and Lazear stress the role of shame arising when
workers produce less than the group average as an important mechanism
in understanding the effectiveness of peer pressure. Carpenter et al. (2009)
emphasize the role of negative reciprocity as a behavioral mechanism leading
contributors to voluntary incur private costs to punish free riders. Evidence of
such behaviors has been found in public good experiments (Fehr and Gächter,
2000; Sefton et al., 2007) as well as in contests between groups (Abbink et al.,
2010; Grosse et al., 2011) stress the popularity of peer monitoring devices
in a modified version of the public good game in which subjects could vote
on whether to use a central monitor or rely on a decentralized monitoring
system (peer monitoring).1 The authors found that subjects mostly relied on
peer monitoring as a disciplining device challenging the idea of Alchian and
Demsetz that a central monitor is needed to avoid free riding behaviors in the
provision of monitoring.
Peer effects have been reported in a series of field experiments. For example,
Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman (2003) report peer effects on students’ grades
among college roommates. Falk and Ichino (2006) found that students who
worked for fixed wages to stuff envelopes performed significantly better when
working in pairs than when working alone. Mas and Moretti (2009) studied
the case of supermarket cashiers and found positive peer effects on the number
of items scanned by cashiers. The authors considered workers’ visual contact
and frequency of interactions as measures of peer pressure.
1Under peer monitoring, each subject decided how much to invest in the monitoring
technology which precision determined the allocation of team profits. In particular, the
proportion of the team profits which was allocated according to individual contributions
increased in the precision of the monitoring technology.
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Our approach differs from previous field works as it introduces anonymous
real-time supervision in a controlled laboratory environment. Our aim is
to measure peer pressure with as much precision as possible by recording
the amount of time subjects spent watching others or the activities which
were completed by the subjects who were being watched. Furthermore, our
anonymous supervision mechanism allows us to isolate the effects of possible
cofounds that may appear in a face to face interaction such as fear of retaliation.
Our peer monitoring technology was such that each team member could
monitor peers’ activities at any point in time during the experiment. As a
result, subjects could shape their monitoring strategy by deciding upon which
subjects to monitor and when to do so.2 Monitors were informed in real-time
about the activities undertaken by supervisees and could therefore identify
whether they were browsing the Internet or producing for the organization.
In the peer pressure monitoring treatment, subjects were notified on their
screen whenever they were being watched by others. This feature induced
social pressure which is defined by Mas and Moretti (2009) as a case in which
workers experience disutility when they are observed behaving selfishly by
their peers.
Our environment offers a unique opportunity to provide a detailed analysis
of peer monitoring activities. In the peer pressure treatment, a large proportion
of subjects (88.3%) decided to monitor others. However, subjects dedicated
only a small proportion of their time to monitoring activities (4.4%), compared
with the proportion of their time subjects spent working (82.5%) or browsing
the Internet (13.1%). Yet, all subjects were being watched for an average
of 22.4% of their time. Team members shared the monitoring burden and
maintained peer pressure during the whole duration of the experiment.
Our main contribution to the peer pressure literature is to show that team
incentives combined with peer monitoring led to levels of performance and
shirking (Internet usage) that were remarkably similar to individual incentives
in the absence of punishments devices, communication technologies or physical
proximity among subjects. In the peer pressure treatment, hourly production
was $1.55 higher (47.1% higher) and Internet usage was 54.1% lower than
under team incentives alone. These findings confirm the conjecture of Kandel
and Lazear (1992) that peer pressure may be an effective solution to the moral
hazard in teams problem identified by Holmström (1982).
In contrast to public good games with monetary punishments (Carpenter,
2007a, 2007b; Fehr and Gächter, 2000), both effort and efficiency were increased
by the introduction of peer monitoring. This was the case because subjects
spent little time watching others as they shared the monitoring burden to limit
the cost of monitoring.
2This endogenous aspect of our monitoring technology can be linked to search experiments
in which subjects decide whether to observe or not their relative performance (Falk et al.,
2006; Burks et al., 2013).
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In addition, we were able to answer the question of “How is peer pressure
generated? (Kandel and Lazear, 1992, p. 805)”. We started by analyzing the
dynamics of peer monitoring and showed that subjects were less likely to switch
from the work task to the Internet if they had been watched in the previous five
minutes. We shed some light on this effect by conducting experiments in which
organizational members could watch each other’s activities without being
noticed by their peers. We show that, in contrast to visible peer monitoring,
the invisible monitoring technology did not reduce shirking. These results
indicate that effective peer monitoring crucially hinges on social pressure.
2 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
2.1 Virtual Organization
We develop a framework in which subjects could undertake a real-effort orga-
nizational task, have access to Internet, and monitor other subjects’ behavior
in real-time.3
2.1.1 The Work Task
We use a long, repetitive and effortful task to ensure that individual perfor-
mance is mostly driven by effort considerations. Subjects were asked to sum
up tables of 36 numbers for one hour and 40 minutes. Each table completed
correctly generated a 40-cent profit while a penalty of 20 cents was subtracted
from individual production for each incorrect answer. After each subject com-
pleted a table, the accumulated individual production was updated so that
subjects knew whether their answer was correct or not. At the end of each
period, and only then, participants were informed about the total amount of
money generated by all 10 participants’ work task during the period.4
2.1.2 Internet Browsing
At any point during the experiment, participants could switch from the
work task to the leisure activity that consisted of browsing the Internet.
Each activity was undertaken separately, in a different screen but the Internet
browser was embedded in the software so that the experimenter could keep a
record of the switching times between activities as well as the exact amount of
3A video presentation of the software is available at http://sites.google.com/site/
vopeerpressure/home/videos.
4Similar real-effort tasks are used by Eriksson et al. (2009), Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007), Bartling et al. (2009), and Dohmen and Falk (2011).
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time subjects spent on each activity. To switch from one activity to another sub-
jects simply had to click on the corresponding option of the drop-down menu
at the bottom-right of their screens. Internet browsing introduced temptation
in the spirit of recent self-control experiments providing on-the-job distraction
activities such as watching a humorous video (Bucciol et al., 2013).5
The consideration of leisure-related issues in the experimental literature
was first introduced in the analysis of labor supply by Dickinson (1999).
Participants had to undertake a two-hour typing task on four different days. In
one of the two treatments (the combined experiment), subjects could leave the
laboratory whenever they had achieved a certain output level. This aimed at
capturing off-the-job leisure activities. In the intensity experiment, the author
assesses on-the-job leisure by studying the pace at which workers completed
the task. In our experimental design we measure on-the-job leisure directly by
recording the exact amount of time each subject spent on the Internet.6
2.1.3 The Click Pay
In addition to the previously mentioned activities, each subject could click
on a yellow box moving slowly from left to right at the bottom of their
screen. A new yellow box appeared every 25 seconds whether the subject was
currently working or browsing the Internet. Each time subjects clicked on the
box they earned 5 cents. Given that the experiment consisted of 5 periods of
20 minutes each, subjects could receive a total of $12.00 just by clicking on
all the 240 yellow boxes that appeared on the screen during the experiment.
This aimed at representing the pay that workers obtain just for being present
at their workstation regardless of their commitment to the work task. This
was implemented to mimic real work environments in which only a portion
of employees’ compensation is pay-for-performance. We also wanted to allow
participants to earn money even when they decided to shirk. This is in the
spirit of Mohnen et al. (2008) who paid subjects (0.10e) to take a 25-second
time-out during which they were not able to work on the incentivized counting
task. The idea is to construct laboratory environments in which on-the-job
shirking is commonly observed so as to be able to uncover the incentive effects
(Corgnet et al., 2011; Corgnet et al., 2015).
2.1.4 Real-time Monitoring
In the monitoring treatments, subjects were able to monitor others’ activities
in real time. We allowed subjects to monitor their peers’ activities at any time
5Note that usage of cell phones was not allowed in the lab so that Internet usage, if any,
was exclusively embedded in the experimental platform.
6Other on-the-job leisure activities, such as giving subjects access to magazines, are
used in related studies (Eriksson et al., 2009; Charness et al., 2010).
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during the experiment by selecting the Watch option. In that respect, our
monitoring technology offers a unique opportunity to assess the effect of peer
pressure over time and examine the conjecture that peer effects may fade away
as time passes (Falk and Ichino, 2006).
Monitoring activities were undertaken in a separate screen so that subjects
could not participate in the work task or the leisure activity while monitoring
others. In the monitoring screen, subjects could decide whether to monitor
only a subset or all the other subjects at the same time. The information
was displayed in a table, where each column showed information regarding
the activities completed by a given subject. Monitors were informed about the
activities undertaken by each subject (Internet, Work Task, or Watch), their
current production as well as their contribution to the work task (in % terms).
In the peer pressure treatment, subjects were notified with a message
stating the experiment ID of the watcher jointly with an eye picture whenever
they were being watched. We also conducted a treatment in which subjects
were not notified when they were being watched by others (invisible monitoring)
so as to isolate the role of social pressure in peer monitoring. Note that social
pressure, though minimal, is not totally eliminated in the invisible monitoring
treatment since workers may still feel that they are watched by their peers
even if they are not notified about it.
The monitoring technology used in the present paper allows for precise
control over the supervision activities which is difficult to obtain in the field
(Bandiera et al., 2005; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009). For
example, we can measure the exact amount of time subjects were watched
by others as well as the amount of time they spent watching others. It is
also possible to identify the watchers as well as the subjects who were being
watched.
Another distinctive feature of our monitoring technology is that subjects
could freely decide upon their monitoring strategy. Subjects could choose who
to monitor and when to do so. This feature of the supervision technology
allows us to study subjects’ monitoring behavior.
Note that our virtual monitoring technology does not allow workers to
hide from the watcher as would be the case in traditional work environments.
However, we believe that our technology may be a good representation of
modern and highly-computerized workplaces that use virtual monitoring to
track employees’ activities (e.g., Virtual Monitoring™).
2.2 Treatments
We ran four treatments. In the baseline, subjects were rewarded on the work
task according to their individual production (treatment I). In the second
treatment (treatment T ), the total production of the 10 subjects participating
in the experiment was equally distributed among them. Our third experiment
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was the peer pressure treatment (treatment TP) which was equivalent to
treatment T except that all ten subjects could monitor others using the peer
monitoring technology. Treatment TPN was similar to treatment TP except
that organizational members were not notified on their screen when they were
being watched by another subject.
In all treatments subjects could individually obtain the full rewards ($2.40
per period) for clicking on yellow boxes. The instructions for each treatment
are available online.7
2.3 Conceptual Framework
We build our conceptual framework on the moral-hazard in teams problem
introduced by Holmström (1982) and on its extension to the presence of peer
monitoring which was proposed by Kandel and Lazear (1992) (see online
appendix for details and proofs). We summarize our findings in the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 (Individual incentives versus team incentives). Produc-
tion is expected to be greater and Internet usage is expected to be lower under
individual incentives than under team incentives.
Regarding the comparison of the team incentives and the peer pressure
treatments, we use the work of Kandel and Lazear (1992) and provide an
illustration of their peer pressure function by referring to the work of Andreoni
and Bernheim (2009) on social image (see online appendix for details and
proofs). In particular, we consider that workers care about their social image
and feel pride if they produce more than a given benchmark level of effort
and feel shame if they fall short of the benchmark. In order to assess the
interaction between audience effects and peer monitoring, we introduce a
distinction between visible (treatment TP) and invisible audiences (treatment
TPN). We assume that a person is more affected by social image concerns
when the audience is visible than when it is not.
In the presence of concerns for social image, we expect to find higher levels
of production in the peer monitoring treatments than in the team incentives
treatment without peer monitoring (Hypothesis 2).
Hypothesis 2 (Peer monitoring). Production is expected to be greater and
Internet usage is expected to be lower in the peer monitoring treatments, than
in the team incentives treatment without peer monitoring as long as workers
are sufficiently concerned with their social image. In that case, workers are
expected to dedicate part of their time to peer monitoring activities so as to
foster the effort of the other workers.
7http://sites.google.com/site/vopeerpressure/home/instructions. Instructions for treat-
ment TPN were the same as for treatment TP except for slide 36 which was removed.
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We should also recognize that one might expect peer monitoring activities
to backfire generating distrust among workers. Recent research has emphasized
this negative aspect of monitoring and put forward that trusting employees
can lead to higher levels of effort than intensive supervision (Frey, 1993; Falk
and Kosfeld, 2006; Fehr et al., 2007a, 2007b; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). We
do not consider crowding-out of effort as our primary hypothesis because the
disciplining effect of supervision has been found to be dominant in the absence
of interpersonal relationships among workers as is the case in our experimental
design (Frey, 1993; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). In addition, crowding-out
effects are likely to be stronger in a principal-agent relationship or in any
situation in which the monitor has some authority on the supervisee’s work.
In our design, we consider a multi-agent monitoring structure in which there
is no principal and no hierarchy among subjects.
Finally, we conjecture that the impact of social image concerns is diminished
under invisible monitoring compared with the peer pressure treatment. As a
result, we expect invisible monitoring to have a lower impact on production
and internet usage than visible monitoring (peer pressure treatment).
Hypothesis 3 (Peer pressure and invisible monitoring). Production is
expected to be lower and Internet usage is expected to be greater in the invisible
monitoring treatment than in the peer pressure treatment.
Interestingly, the invisible monitoring treatment will also help us assess
whether any effect of the peer monitoring technology can be accounted for
by the access to continuous feedback on others’ production levels. In partic-
ular, if the effect of peer monitoring on workers’ production levels is driven
by the access to feedback rather than to social pressure we should observe
invisible monitoring to perform as well as the peer pressure treatment (see Niki-
forakis (2010) for the study of feedback in public good games with monetary
punishments).
2.4 Procedures
Our subject pool consisted of students from a major American university with
a diverse population. Participants were recruited by emails from a pool of
more than 2,000 students who had signed up to participate in experiments.
The experiments took place in December 2010 and February 2011. In total,
246 subjects participated in the experiment, divided in 25 sessions. We ran
seven sessions for treatment I, and six sessions for each of treatments T , TP,
and TPN. Ten students participated in each session, except for two sessions of
8 students in treatment I.8
8We conducted two to four sessions (maximum capacity of the lab) at a time rendering
the identification of session partners difficult. Also, subjects were called sequentially for
payments and left the facility right away.
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The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screens. Subjects
had exactly 20 minutes to read the instructions. Three minutes before the end
of the instructions period, a monitor entered the room announcing the time
remaining and handing out a printed copy of the summary of the instructions.
None of the participants asked for extra time to read the instructions.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash,
rounded up to the nearest quarter. Participants in treatments I, T , TP, and
TPN earned on average $27.25, $24.45, $27.10, and $24.95 respectively. This
includes a $7.00 show-up fee. Experimental sessions lasted on average two
hours and fifteen minutes.
3 Results
3.1 Team Incentives versus Individual Incentives
3.1.1 Individual Production
We define production as the monetary amount generated by a subject’s answers
on the work task divided by the reward for each correct answer (40 cents).
It can be interpreted as the total number of correct tables completed by a
given subject discounted by the number of incorrect answers. In both the
treatments, period production steadily increased except for the third period as
is illustrated in Figure 1. The positive trend in production levels can be seen
as evidence of a learning effect which is commonly observed in long arithmetic
tasks (Charness and Campbell, 1988). The increase in production overtime
should not be seen as evidence of limited shirking under team incentives. For
example, the positive trend is less pronounced under team incentives than
under individual incentives (see Table II.1 in the online appendix for regression
analyses). Also, subjects who produced more than the group average increased
their production overtime under individual incentives whereas they failed to
do so under team incentives (see Table II.2 in the online appendix).
Average individual production per period was equal to 4.21 tables under
individual incentives compared with 2.83 tables under team incentives. This
corresponds to a 48.8% production gap ($1.65 in hourly production) between
individual and team incentives (see Table A1 in the appendix for statistical
analyses).9 This finding also holds when comparing individual production
across treatments for each of the five periods separately.
9We use clustered t-tests and clustered rank-sum tests. The clustered version of the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed using Datta and Satten test (2005) while the clustered
version of the t-test followed (Donner et al., 1981). We aim at controlling for the fact that
individual production in a given session may be affected by group production. This correction
is especially relevant for the treatment with team incentives in which case the contributions
of other group members, displayed on a subject’s screen at the end of each period, may
affect an individual’s motivation.
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Figure 1: Average production per period across treatments.
Result 1 (Work task production: Individual versus team incentives). Total
production and period production were significantly greater in the individual
incentives treatment than in the team incentives treatment.
Result 1 is not surprising in the light of incentive theory (Hypothesis 1) but
constitutes an essential step in the empirical analysis of incentives given the
limited evidence of free riding behaviors in teams in controlled environments
using real-effort tasks. A related analysis was conducted by Nalbantian and
Schotter (1997) in an abstract experimental setting in which the authors
compared different types of group incentives programs ranging from revenue
sharing (team incentives) to target-based and team-tournament incentives.10
3.1.2 Internet Usage
We report a positive trend in Internet usage in both treatments which is most
pronounced under team incentives (see Table II.3 in the online appendix for
regression analyses). This suggests that the treatment effect became stronger
over time as subjects’ fatigue and boredom set in. Under team incentives
subjects spent on average 28.5% of their time browsing the Internet while this
percentage was only equal to 11.9% under individual incentives. We reject the
10We do not study different types of group incentives schemes. Rather, we focus on team
incentives (revenue sharing) schemes. Notice that Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) did not
compare individual and team incentives. Indeed, individual incentives schemes in an abstract
effort setting automatically lead subjects to choose the efficient level of effort e*. Instead,
the authors study the more interesting case of a wage-cum-supervision mechanism. In that
case, agents are paid a wage W as long as they are not caught by the principal choosing an
effort level below e* in which case they would receive a lower wage (W−<W ). Under this
scheme, the principal can only verify the chosen level of effort with a given probability p.
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hypothesis that Internet usage was identical for individual and team incentives
whether it is for the whole experiment or for each of the five periods analyzed
separately (see Table A1 in the appendix). These findings are in line with
Hypothesis 1.
Result 2 (Internet usage: Individual versus team incentives).
(i) Internet usage was significantly lower in the individual incentives treat-
ment compared with team incentives. This result also holds when analyzing
each period separately.
(ii) The increase in Internet usage over time was significantly more pro-
nounced in the team incentives treatment than in the individual incentives
treatment.
Related experiments have stressed the relevance of off-the-job leisure activ-
ities that were assessed by analyzing quitting behaviors (Dickinson, 1999;
Falk and Huffman, 2007) but these studies have not assessed the impact of
on-the-job leisure on performance.
This finding emphasizes that, in an environment with a long and real-
effort task in which fatigue was likely to set in, high-powered incentives
were very effective in bringing down Internet usage. Indeed, subjects spent
almost three times as long on the Internet under team incentives than under
individual incentives. The introduction of Internet as an alternative activity is
a crucial feature of our environment that may have led subjects to consider
leisure activities to be as salient as the work task. Yet, many subjects never
consulted the Internet (40.9% and 11.7% under individual and team incentives,
respectively) focusing exclusively on completing the work task. The incentives
effects identified in the current study are unlikely to be identified in an
experimental environment in which subjects do not have access to on-the-job
leisure activities (Corgnet et al., 2015).11
Note that in addition to the work task and Internet browsing, subjects could
obtain earnings from clicking on boxes appearing at the bottom of their screen.
Unsurprisingly, no significant differences were observed across treatments as
subjects successfully clicked on the box in 98% (97%) of its appearances under
individual (team) incentives. We report no differences across treatments (all
p-values> 0.5).
11In this paper, we study the effect of not allowing the subjects to access the internet
during the experiment for both individual and team incentives. We find that, under team
incentives, production levels were significantly lower when Internet browsing was available
than when it was not. Under individual incentives, however, no differences in production
levels were observed between the treatment in which Internet was available and the treatment
in which it was not.
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3.2 Peer Monitoring
We start the analysis of peer monitoring by providing general statistics on
watching activities for both monitoring treatments, with (treatment TP) and
without notification (treatment TPN ).
3.2.1 Watching Activities
Subjects were watched 22.4% (29.9%) of the time in treatment TP (TPN )
while subjects’ dedication to monitoring activities was limited to 4.4% (5.3%)
of their available time. This occurred because most watchers, regardless of the
monitoring treatment, decided to monitor all subjects at the same time. As a
result, the amount of time subjects were being watched during the experiment
was similar across subjects. In particular, subjects with different levels of
performance were being watched for the same amount of time (see Table II.4
in the online appendix).12
On average, subjects monitored their peers 5.7 (6.9) times during the
experiment for an average duration of 46 (45) seconds per watching episode
in treatment TP (TPN ). It is interesting to note that subjects were willing to
dedicate a significant amount of their time to monitor others even in the case
in which monitors could not exert peer pressure on other subjects (treatment
TPN ). This suggests that, besides exerting peer pressure, subjects monitored
others to obtain feedback about their relative performance as well as to scruti-
nize others’ behavior in the organization. Comparing monitoring treatments, we
observe no statistically significant differences regarding the amount of time sub-
jects spent watching others (see Table A2 in the appendix). However, we find
that subjects were watched significantly more often under the invisible moni-
toring treatment than under the peer pressure treatment. This follows from the
fact that in the invisible monitoring treatment subjects were significantly less
likely to watch only a subset of the other nine organizational members (5.1%
of the watching episodes) than under peer pressure (11.1% of the watching
episodes). These findings are consistent with the fact that, in treatment TPN,
monitoring was driven by the willingness to observe others’ behaviors and
compare oneself with the group while in treatment TP, monitoring could have
been partly driven by concerns for exerting peer pressure. Even though we
cannot disentangle the exact motive of watchers in the peer pressure treatment,
we know that watching others induced peer pressure (whether it is intentional
or not) because those who were being watched were explicitly notified.
12This result should be interpreted with care as it may simply be due to the fact that
monitoring all subjects was quick and easy (the option to “monitor all” was used in 93.3%
of the watching episodes) making the decision of whom to monitor less relevant. In our
setting, monitoring all subjects could be done at no extra cost by clicking on the “monitor
all” button.
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Interestingly, monitoring did not fade away over time. The proportion of
their time subjects spent watching others was equal to 4.2% (4.8%) in the
first period compared to 5.6% (5.4%) in the last period in treatment TP
(TPN ). Considering the experiment as a whole, only 7 out of 60 (3 out of 60)
of the subjects did not spend any time monitoring their peers in treatment
TP (TPN ). In our experiment, monitoring entailed an opportunity cost since
subjects who watched others had to leave the work task screen affecting their
production negatively. However, this monitoring cost was shared among team
members because subjects were paid according to team incentives. As a result,
any decline in production due to monitoring activities would affect all workers
in the same magnitude. Our environment differs from the model presented
by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and tested by Grosse et al. (2011) in which
subjects who are paid according to their individual contribution would incur
an individual cost for monitoring.
Interestingly, subjects rarely watched the same person at the same time.
This occurred only in 16.7% and 17.4% of the watching episodes in treatments
TP and TPN (proportion test, p-value=0.924). It is not surprising to report
that all subjects were watched during the experiment for at least 12 minutes
(16 minutes) in treatment TP (TPN ). In treatment TP, we also observe
that subjects were more likely to be watched right after watching others (see
Table II.5 in the online appendix for the analysis).13
Result 3 (Watching activities).
(i) Regardless of the monitoring treatment, watching activities were limited
to a small percentage of subjects’ available time. Nevertheless, all subjects
were being watched during the experiment for an average of 22.4% and
29.9% of the duration of the experiment in treatments TP and TPN,
respectively.
(ii) Regardless of the monitoring treatment, watching activities did not fade
away across periods.
(iii) The magnitude of watching activities was similar across monitoring
treatments. However, monitors were more likely to watch only a subset
of subjects in treatment TP than in treatment TPN. As a result, subjects
were more likely to be watched in treatment TPN than in treatment TP.
3.2.2 Comparison of Individual Production Across Treatments
Average production was 47.1% larger (hourly production was $1.55 higher)
in the peer pressure treatment than in the team incentives treatment. The
13This could be seen as evidence of retaliation. We thank an anonymous referee for
suggesting this analysis.
Peer Pressure and Moral Hazard in Teams: Experimental Evidence 393
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
Team incentives
Individual Incentives
Peer pressure
Invisible monitoring
Figure 2: Average production per period for all treatments.
statistical significance of our results holds across periods (see Table A1 in the
appendix). Average total production under peer pressure (20.6) was remarkably
close to the case of individual incentives (21.0). Similarly to previous treatments,
individual production in the monitoring treatments increased over time (see
Figure 2). These findings are in line with Hypothesis 2.
In our design, peer monitoring was costing money to the firm by detracting
employees from their work. In the peer pressure treatment, employees spent
4.4% of their time monitoring others but this opportunity cost was offset by
the strong positive impact of peer monitoring on employee productivity.14
Invisible monitoring did not lead to any significant increase in either total
or period production with respect to the team incentives treatment without
monitoring (see Figure 2 and Table A1 in the appendix). At the same time,
invisible monitoring led to average production levels which were 26.9% and
28.4% lower (hourly production was $1.33 and $1.43 lower) than in the peer
pressure and individual incentives treatments. These findings are consistent
with Hypothesis 3.
Result 4 (Work task production: Peer monitoring versus team and individual
incentives).
(i) Total production and period production were significantly greater in the
peer pressure treatment than in the team incentives treatment.
(ii) Total production and period production were not significantly different
between the peer pressure and the individual incentives treatments.
14The monitoring cost did not include a fixed monetary cost such as the one incurred,
for example, for purchasing the virtual monitoring technology.
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(iii) Total production and period production were not significantly different
between the invisible monitoring treatment and the team incentives treat-
ment without monitoring.
(iv) Total production and period production were significantly lower in the
invisible monitoring treatment than in the peer pressure treatment.
The absence of any positive effect on production levels in the invisible
monitoring treatment suggests that social pressure is a crucial element of the
effectiveness of the monitoring technology. We conducted additional analyses
and showed that being watched by others in a given time span of five minutes
increased one’s own production in the next five to ten minutes in the peer
pressure treatment (see Table A3 in appendix). By contrast, watching others
in a given time span of five minutes did not affect one’s own production in
the following minutes. Interestingly, the increase in production that follows
from being watched was more pronounced when a subject was watched by
more than one watcher (see Table II.6 in the online appendix).15 This result
confirms the intuition that the effect of peer pressure is magnified by the
number of supervisors. This positive effect is also present in the Kandel and
Lazear (1992) model of peer pressure.
Our results also show the robustness of peer effects encountered in the
field (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009) in a controlled labora-
tory experiment. We were able to obtain strong peer monitoring effects under
anonymity and in the absence of monetary punishments. In field studies such as
the one designed by Mas and Moretti (2009), workers were not anonymous and
could potentially face retaliation for non-cooperative behaviors. In our design,
the interaction between subjects was anonymous so as to prevent any form of
retaliation after the experiment. In contrast to field studies (Falk and Ichino,
2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009) and public good games with threats (Masclet
et al., 2003), subjects were not allowed to communicate in our experiment. The
effectiveness of our peer monitoring technology did not rely on physical prox-
imity, verbal threats or face to face interactions. The fact that our monitoring
technology was highly effective despite the absence of physical proximity and
face to face communication is especially relevant given the growing interest for
virtual monitoring devices within firms. A large number of programs such as
Spector Soft, Virtual Monitoring™, Employee Monitoring or Webwatcher are
already available to monitor employees’ activities in real time. These platforms
closely resemble our experimental implementation of virtual monitoring by
allowing monitors to scrutinize employees’ activities and track the time spent
15This is the case because in our regression analysis the interaction term between the
amount of time a subject was watched and the number of watchers (in t− 2) is positive and
significant. This shows that the positive effect of peer monitoring is not solely driven by
the amount of time a subject was watched but also by the number of subjects who were
watching. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
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on various applications whether using their desktop computers, laptops or
smart phones. Importantly, our findings complement previous research on peer
effects by showing that peer monitoring can exactly offset the loss in production
resulting from the use of team incentives schemes which are pervasive in firms.
In contrast to other supervision mechanisms, peer monitoring does not seem
to induce crowding-out of effort which has been reported in recent experimen-
tal works (Frey, 1993; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008).
These authors stress that supervision may be perceived as a signal of distrust
and, as a result, undermine workers’ effort. Frey (1993) as well as Dickinson
and Villeval (2008) put forward that the crowding-out effect that results from
monitoring activities dominates its disciplining effect when there exist inter-
personal relationships between managers and employees, whereas the opposite
tends to be true in the absence of such relationships. In that respect, our
findings are consistent with these previous works since our experimental design
is characterized by the absence of interpersonal relationships among workers.
3.2.3 Comparison of Internet Usage Across Treatments
Similarly to previous treatments, we identify a positive trend in Internet usage
for both monitoring treatments. The proportion of time subjects dedicated
to Internet in treatment TP [TPN ] in the first two periods was only 7.7%
[9.7%] on average compared with 16.7% [26.4%] in the last three periods.
Peer monitoring had a considerable impact on Internet usage (see Figure 3),
however.16 The average proportion of time subjects spent on Internet was
significantly lower in the peer pressure treatment (13.1%) than in the team
incentives treatment (28.5%). This difference in Internet usage was significant
whether considering total Internet usage or Internet usage per period (see
Table A1 in the appendix). Interestingly, we find slightly significant differences
in Internet usage between the invisible monitoring treatment (19.8%) and the
team incentives treatment (28.5%). This supports the conjecture that social
pressure may not be fully eliminated in the invisible monitoring treatment.
Subjects may refrain from using the Internet so as to avoid being caught by
an invisible monitor. Nevertheless, Internet usage was significantly lower in
the peer pressure treatment than under invisible monitoring.
The evolution of Internet usage was remarkably similar for the peer pressure
and the individual incentives treatments (see Table A1 in the appendix). By
16 The results reported in this section are similar if we analyze working time (time spent
on the work task) rather than Internet usage (see Table A1). Using working time instead of
Internet usage allows us to control for the fact that monitoring activities may have been
used by subjects as an alternative leisure activity. One could argue that the low Internet
usage in peer monitoring treatments is due to the substitutability between monitoring and
Internet activities.
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Figure 3: Average Internet usage (in %) for all treatments across periods.
contrast, internet usage was significantly higher under invisible monitoring
(19.8%) than under individual incentives (11.9%).
In addition, we analyze whether knowing that they were being watched
affected subjects’ use of the Internet during the experiment. We show that
in the peer pressure treatment, subjects were less likely to switch from the
work task to the Internet if they had been watched by others in the previous
five minutes (see Table II.7 in the online appendix). In sum, the introduction
of peer monitoring in our experimental design brings down Internet usage.
This is an important finding given the growing concern for cyber-slacking
(Malachowski, 2005; Young, 2006).
Result 5 (Internet usage: Peer monitoring versus team and individual incen-
tives).
(i) Internet usage was significantly lower in the peer pressure treatment than
in the team incentives treatment. Also, Internet usage was marginally
lower in the invisible monitoring treatment than in the team incentives
treatment.
(ii) Internet usage was not significantly different between the peer pressure
and the individual incentives treatments. However, Internet usage was
significantly higher in the invisible monitoring treatment than in the
individual incentives and peer pressure treatments.
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4 Conclusions
We studied peer monitoring as an example of mechanism that may allow orga-
nizations to recover the efficiency loss provoked by the use of weak incentives.
We found that using team incentives in combination with peer monitoring
allowed organizations to reach production levels that were as high as in the case
of individual incentives. In contrast to public good games with punishments,
both effort and efficiency were increased by the use of peer monitoring. To our
knowledge, ours is the first controlled experiment showing that peer monitoring
can offset the loss in efficiency resulting from the use of low-powered incentives
schemes. Peer monitoring was particularly effective because subjects spent a
limited amount of time watching others while sharing the monitoring burden
so that all subjects were being watched at least once during the experiment.
It is as if people possessed natural skills for peer monitoring and understood
both its positive effect on productivity as well as the negative consequences of
its intensive use.
Peer monitoring is traditionally seen as a decisive advantage of organizations
where its effectiveness usually relies on face to face and repeated interactions
among parties that are inherent to the organizational environment (Bandiera
et al., 2005; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009). Interestingly, the
implementation of virtual monitoring devices of the type used in our study
may mitigate the comparative advantage of traditional organizations vis-à-vis
virtual organizations and other decentralized organizational structures.
Appendix
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Total
Treatment I vs. Prod. +48.2% +40.3% +50.1% +51.6% +52.0% +48.8%
Treatment T 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.006 0.004 0.002
(0.029) (0.028) (0.043) (0.025) (0.020) (0.009)
Internet
usage17
−70.3% −70.9% −50.7% −51.7% −58.1% −58.2%
0.003 0.002 0.024 0.006 0.001 <0.001
(0.021) (0.019) (0.050) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008)
Treatment T vs. Prod. −36.1% −27.3% −29.8% −34.5% −29.1% −31.3%
Treatment TP 0.012 0.061 0.060 0.039 0.035 0.019
(0.028) (0.124) (0.094) (0.095) (0.084) (0.049)
Table A1: Percentage differences and p-values for clustered t-tests (rank-sum tests) assessing
differences in production, Internet usage and working time across treatments.
17Working time p-values are identical to Internet usage, as there are no other activities
available in these treatments.
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 Total
Internet
usage
+122.5% +161.5% +92.0% +109.9% +123.4% +117.2%
0.034 0.011 0.044 0.008 0.001 0.003
(0.128) (0.032) (0.083) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010)
Work
time
−3.5% −13.9% −14.2% −18.6% −18.1% −13.4%
0.383 0.049 0.144 0.045 0.025 0.035
(0.280) (0.332) (0.560) (0.121) (0.047) (0.094)
Treatment I vs. Prod. −5.3% +1.9% +5.4% −0.8% +7.8% +2.1%
Treatment TP 0.755 0.900 0.757 0.959 0.581 0.866
(0.778) (0.639) (0.819) (0.932) (0.537) (0.712)
Internet
usage
−33.9% −23.9% −5.4% +1.4% −6.5% −9.1%
0.283 0.438 0.874 0.963 0.842 0.728
(0.187) (0.785) (0.490) (0.747) (0.265) (0.754)
Work
time
+6.9% +6.4% +6.7% +5.2% +8.5% +6.7%
0.003 0.063 0.341 0.456 0.192 0.114
(0.003) (0.058) (0.058) (0.097) (0.011) (0.058)
Treatment I vs. Prod. +23.6% +47.9% +43.2% +37.6% +43.9% +39.6%
Treatment TPN 0.198 0.007 0.052 0.037 0.012 0.009
(0.185) (0.020) (0.075) (0.065) (0.028) (0.024)
Internet
usage
−31.8% −47.0% −41.7% −34.9% −40.2% −39.6%
0.405 0.046 0.058 0.121 0.072 0.042
(0.230) (0.104) (0.069) (0.081) (0.021) (0.047)
Work
time
+7.4% +16.0% +23.9% +21.5% +22.3% +17.6%
0.007 0.001 0.005 0.020 0.009 0.001
(0.017) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Treatment T vs. Prod. −16.6% +5.5% −4.6% −9.2% −5.3% −6.0%
Treatment TPN 0.325 0.779 0.816 0.652 0.744 0.687
0.325 0.779 0.816 0.652 0.744 0.687
Internet
usage
+129.8% +82.0% +18.3% +34.7% +42.9% +44.3%
0.040 0.073 0.533 0.233 0.102 0.110
(0.129) (0.188) (0.390) (0.168) (0.022) (0.114)
Work
time
−3.0% −6.2% −0.3% −5.9% −7.7% −4.6%
0.479 0.436 0.976 0.616 0.418 0.531
(0.522) (0.631) (0.468) (0.916) (0.813) (0.898)
Treatment TP vs. Prod. +30.6% +45.2% +35.9% +38.7% +33.5% +36.7%
Treatment TPN 0.096 0.043 0.111 0.108 0.069 0.054
(0.176) (0.087) (0.122) (0.156) (0.099) (0.099)
Internet
usage
+3.3% −30.4% −38.4% −35.8% −36.0% −33.6%
0.941 0.265 0.100 0.127 0.106 0.097
(0.895) (0.226) (0.160) (0.146) (0.148) (0.067)
Work
time
+0.5% +9.0% +16.1% +15.5% +12.7% +10.1%
0.883 0.076 0.072 0.116 0.128 0.070
(0.839) (0.085) (0.152) (0.092) (0.105) (0.060)
Table A1: Continued
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Proportion
of watching
episodes for Number
Length of which only one Amount of of times
Watching watching (all) subject(s) is time being a subject is
time episodes monitored watched watched
Regression type Tobit with Tobit with Probit with Tobit with Poisson with
random random random random random
effects effects effects effects effects
P -value associated 0.165 0.573 0.041 <0.001 <0.001
with the TPN (0.075)
treatment dummy
Table A2: P -values associated with the TPN treatment dummy capturing differences across
monitoring treatments.
Note: All regressions are completed at the minute level and all include a trend. These results
are robust to the cases of the 5-minute analysis as well as to the case of the analysis per period.
Coefficients
Intercept −0.803***
Being watched in t-1 0.001
Being watched in t-2 0.002***
Watching in t-1 −0.001
Watching in t-2 0.001
Trend 0.066***
Number of observations n=1080
and Log likelihood 398 left-censored
Loglikelihood=−1324.595, Prob>χ2=0
Table A3: Tobit regression with random effects for individual production in a 5-minute time
span18
Note: *p-value< 0.10, **p-value< 0.05, and ***p-value< 0.01.
In Table A3, we use a 5-minute time frame to assess the impact of watch-
ing activities on real-time production. The independent variables related to
watching activities are referred to as Watching and Being watched. These vari-
ables measure the amount of time (in seconds) that a subject spent watching
others (Watching) and the amount of time (in seconds) a subject was watched
(Being watched) by at least one subject in a given time span of five minutes.
We introduce independent variables with lags so as to mitigate possible endo-
18An independent variable accounting for the number of watchers is not statistically
significant when introduced in the specification of the regression. This may be due to the
fact that the information on the number of watchers was not made particularly salient. In
case a subject was watched by more than one person, the following indication was printed
on the screen: “more than one subject is watching you.”
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geneity issues.19 We include a trend as independent variable so as to control
for the steady increase of production across periods.20
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